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Abstract 
This paper examines two properties of the South African NOSA 5-Star System, 
a voluntary occupational health and safety (OHS) management system.  The 
first property is the association between system implementation and final OHS 
outcomes measured as incidence rates of fatal and permanently disabling 
injury.  The second is the association between the Star audit rating and rates of 
serious occupational injury.  
Although there are many uncertainties involved the paper argues that 
companies committed to the NOSA system experienced fewer fatal and 
permanently disabling injuries than the general manufacturing sector.  The 
paper also examines an inverse correlation between the Star rating and the 
injury incidence rate.  It is concluded that the Star rating is a sound although 
imperfect predictor of injury rates.  The fact that auditing is an entirely 
voluntary activity likely distorts the Star rating to some extent.  It is speculated 
that some (unsafe) companies may abandon or pause auditing if they 
experience too many injuries.  There is also some evidence to suggest that 
companies with poor safety attitudes are able to successfully deceive auditors.   
The paper suggests that voluntary OHS audit systems are embedded in 
structural problems that set limits to what they can reasonably be expected to 
accomplish.  The fundamental issues are about naivety and the intrinsic 
viability of self-regulation.  In a broader view however, the adoption of such 
systems might well be endorsed by policymakers because of their positive 
impact on OHS.  It is clear though, that such systems cannot substitute 
authority enforcement activities. 
 
Keywords: voluntary occupational health and safety (OHS) management 
system, audit score, effectiveness, final OHS outcomes 
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Research highlights 
• The NOSA 5-Star System is a voluntary occupational safety management 
system 
• System implementation is measured with a Star-rating 
• NOSA companies have a lower incidence of serious occupational injury 
• There is inverse correlation between the Star rating and the incidence rate 
of serious injury 
• The Star rating is a sound although imperfect predictor of injury rates 
•  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
For decades, systematic occupational health and safety (OHS) management has 
been the main international strategy to improve health and safety at work.  Two 
categories exist.  1) Mandatory regulations of OHS management are public 
politics codified into law and compliance is supervised by labour inspectorates.  
2) Voluntary OHS management systems are (mostly) proprietary products sold 
on the market and are to be verified by audits and certification schemes (Frick 
2011).  
Early voluntary management systems addressed safety only, i.e. not health, like 
the International Safety Rating (ISR) developed and distributed by the 
International Loss Control Institute (Georgia, USA) in the 1970s and 1980s.  
This system evolved into the International Safety Rating System (ISRS) which 
in a revised form is now distributed by Det Norske Veritas (DNV).  The IRS 
has also laid the foundation for so-called 5-Star-programs.  Many employers in, 
for example, Australia, North America and South Africa have used this 
program (Frick 2011).  Other examples of voluntary systems are the British 
Standards Institute’s OHSAS 18001, the Canadian Standards Association’s 
CSA Z1000, the Chemical Industries Association’s Responsible Care 
programme, the International Maritime Organisation’s International Safety 
Management (ISM) Code and New Zealand’s AS/NZS 484.   
Companies may seek to limit exposure to uncertainty by joining business 
networks and agree on certain codes of good practice.  Voluntary OHS 
management systems programs can therefore be seen as processes of so-called 
mutual or self-regulation where companies organise themselves in networks 
with shared minimum norms of acceptable behaviour.  Frick and Zwetsloot 
(2007) suggest that OHSAS 18001’s popularity in exporting countries is 
enhanced by the drive for corporate social responsibility (CSR), which makes 
consumer oriented corporations require their suppliers to demonstrate 
conformity with minimum labour and other standards. 
Despite that voluntary OHS management systems have been in operation for 
decades and despite their apparent popularity only few evaluation studies exist.  
Intriguingly, some studies have raised concerns if the systems are able to 1) 
reduce the number of injuries, and, 2) audit and rate the pro-active efforts 
undertaken by company management.  Quite obviously, such capabilities are 
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essential if these systems should play a meaningful role, in self regulation or 
otherwise.  Robson et al. (2007) concluded there was real knowledge gap in this 
area. They found insufficient evidence in the published, peer-reviewed 
literature on the effectiveness of voluntary OHS management systems to make 
recommendations either in favour of or against them.  
The present paper makes a contribution to filling this gap by examining the 
association between implementation of the South African NOSA 5-Star Safety 
Management system and the rate of serious occupational injury for the period 
1997-1999.  
1.2 History of the National Occupational Safety 
Association (NOSA) 
In the 1950s the South African Minister of Labour investigated ways of 
reducing wastage of manpower due to accidents.  This led to the establishment 
in 1951 of the National Occupational Safety Organisation (NOSA) as a not-for-
profit organisation, modelled on the Industrial Accident Prevention Association 
of Ontario (Canada).  It was set up as a joint venture between the Workmen's 
Compensation Commissioner (WCC) and employers' associations and funded 
extensively by the State Accident Fund.  NOSA has over the years been a major 
actor on the OHS scene is South Africa. It has developed a broad range of 
training courses offered to industry. The curriculum developed for its own 
people was eventually taken over by the Department of National Education and 
so established the National Diploma in Safety Management (Dekker 1990).  
NOSA has also published safety magazines and organized annual safety 
conferences.  Funding from the State Accident Fund was gradually withdrawn 
after 1995 and NOSA became a fully privately owned company in 2000, 
generating income through training courses, seminars and audits (Walt 1999).  
After a liquidity crisis in 2005, NOSA re-emerged under new private ownership 
(Hill 2005).  
Of particular interest to this paper, NOSA has developed the so-called NOSA 
5-Star Safety Management System with the stated dual purposes of directing 
companies' accident prevention activities and offering recognition of the extent 
to which excellence in safety management has been attained.   
1.3 The NOSA 5-Star System 
The NOSA 5-Star System owes much intellectual debt to other star rating 
systems, notably the International Safety Rating (ISR) developed by Frank Bird 
of ILCI, the International Loss Control Institute (Bird 1983) and in turn to the 
ideas of Herbert Heinrich (Hedlund 2011).  Similar to the ISR, the NOSA 
system is also based on the idea of Management by Objectives.  Objectives are 
set for management to attain and a 5-Star rating evaluation scheme has been 
developed to measure the extent to which the objectives have been met.  "A one 
Star grading would indicate that a rather weak accident prevention programme 
is in operation whereas a five Star grading would indicate that it is one of the 
safest factories in the country" (Dekker 1990).  Stars are awarded based on two 
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criteria:  The measurement of management's efforts to reach the objectives, 
called the effort leg, and the actual “disabling incident incidence rate” (DIIR) of 
the workplace, called the experience leg.  Furthermore, some 5-Star companies 
can enter a regional competition.  The winner is awarded with the so-called 
NOSCAR recognition which can be considered an elite sixth-Star bracket.1 
The 5-Star System under study comprises 72 elements organised under five 
main sections.  Elements are subdivided into about 300 components, sometimes 
also referred to as NOSA Minimum Standards.  In order to guide the audit 
procedure each component is further specified into a number of Items for 
Consideration. A maximum point score is allocated to each of the 300 
components.  During the audit procedure, the NOSA auditor team assesses the 
level of compliance with each component and assigns a point score 
accordingly.  The programme score is computed as the sum of actual scores 
divided by the maximum point score, which gives the effort rating, a number 
between 0-100 percent.  The DIIR is computed as the number of “disabling 
incidents” per 200,000 hours worked, which gives the experience rating.  The 
number of NOSA Stars is then determined from the criteria in Table 1.  
Table 1 Criteria for awarding NOSA Stars   
Star rating Effort  
(percent) 
 Experience  
(DIIR) 
5 Star - excellent ≥ 91 and ≤ 1 
4 Star - very good ≥ 75 and ≤ 2 
3 Star - good ≥ 61 and ≤ 3 
2 Star - average ≥ 51 and ≤ 4 
1 Star - fair ≥ 40 and ≤ 5 
(Source:  Audit Workbook, NOSA 1997) 
The basic definition of a disabling incident (DI) is one in which one or more 
workdays or shifts were lost, i.e. a “disablement” of the worker’s capability to 
carry out normal duties, as well as any incident covered by the Compensation 
for Occupational Injuries and Disease's Act (COID 1997).  The definition is so 
shaped that, for example, reallocation of an injured worker to light duty will not 
circumvent that the incident be recorded as a DI.  The full complexity of the 
procedure need not be covered in this paper, but it is important for the later 
                                                   
1  The so-called NOSCAR category (a play on the words NOSA Oscar) can for practical 
reasons be considered an elite 'sixth Star' bracket in the 'five-Star' system.  Rules are com-
plex but in short, only 5-Star companies that have a very high effort score of 95+, and no 
fatal injuries, are eligible to enter a Regional contest the coming year where they will be 
audited by a specially qualified team of NOSA auditors.  Applicable Regions shall have at 
least 200 graded companies.  At the end of 1999 there were seven such Regions comprising 
five South African geographic regions, a mining division and an international competition.  
The winner of a Regional contest is awarded the prestigious NOSCAR recognition.  If 
awarded, the NOSCAR status can be retained for consecutive years, conditional that 
NOSCAR contest eligibility criteria remain fulfilled.  Whenever eligibility criteria are vio-
lated the NOSCAR recognition is lost and the company must win a new Regional competi-
tion to regain it (Source:  NOSA internal procedure MR05, appendix 1, rev 01, copy ob-
tained Jan 25, 2000, and personal communication with NOSA auditors) 
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discussion to note that the experience rating generally is based on the accident 
experience of the previous 365 days from the day of the audit.  For smaller sites 
the DIIR computation may be based on a longer period.2 
The system has been revised on a number of occasions.  A major revision took 
place in 1996 with the inclusion of health issues and an increased attention to 
risk analysis techniques (Morice 1995).  Another revision took place in 2000 
introducing audit scores for environmental management to form an integrated 
safety, health and environmental management system.  The system was stable 
over the period of study. 
The five main sections of the NOSA system are 1) premises and housekeeping, 
2) mechanical, electrical and personal safeguarding, 3) fire protection and 
prevention, 4) incident recording and investigation, and 5) health and safety 
organisation.  The system and audit procedure are described in more detail in 
Hedlund (2002).  An example from the Audit Workbook (NOSA 1997) 
illustrates the workings of the system: 
Section 1.00  Premises and housekeeping 
• Element 1.22  Good stacking and storage practices 
- Component 1.22.2  Stacking neat, stable and controlled 
- 1.22.2.a  Stacks correctly erected (max height = 3 x shortest base) 
- 1.22.2.b  Stacks bonded to prevent tumbling 
Items for consideration under this component are:  Who is responsible for safe 
stacking?  What risks have been identified relating to unsafe stacking?  What 
criteria are used to establish that persons responsible are qualified, trained and 
experienced? 
The example highlights three important system characteristics.  First, the 
emphasis on management bureaucratic controls. Second, the use of generic risk 
analysis approaches.  Third, that the system also sets prescriptive standards to 
e.g. permissible stacking height, lifting tackle checklists, scaffolding 
inspections, to mention a few.  The NOSA system hereby differs from other 
safety management approaches framed on quality management systems that 
deal extensively with broadly framed process standards, emphasizing 
management practices, action plans and continuous improvement, but have 
few, if any, prescriptive standards.  
Because of the great number of system elements and the emphasis on 
bureaucratic controls and an auditable paper trail, companies usually have to 
                                                   
2  The purpose is not to disadvantage smaller companies.  A work year corresponds to about 
2,000 work hours. The DIIR definition implies that a company with about 100 workers can 
experience one DI per year and still meet the criteria for a 5-Star rating.  Accidents are sto-
chastic events and companies with fewer than 100 workers are therefore allowed to base 
their DIIR computation on a period longer than one year. 
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employ a full time Safety Officer, who refers to the Site Manager or the CEO.  
The entire process thereby becomes driven by management.  This is fully 
consistent with the Loss Control maxims that all accidents are caused by Lack 
of Management Control.  But it also hints at low levels of employee 
participation.  Workers are trained to follow safe procedures, but their advice or 
suggestions are generally not sought when such procedures are defined, a 
practice which is not uncommon in the South African context (Hedlund 2000).  
1.4 Critique of 5-Star systems 
While the 5-Star system is popular in South African industry (Hedlund 2011), 
occupational safety star rating systems have attracted searing criticism in 
international journals.  Eisner and Leger (1988a) examined accident statistics of 
South African mines classified in the top 5-Star bracket of the International 
Mine Safety Rating (IMSR) scheme.  They voiced concern if declining injury 
rates can be taken as proof of improvement in mine safety in the face of stable 
fatality rates.  They argued that the decline in injury rates more likely was 
attributable to under-reporting and suggested that the IMSR scheme had 
motivated this3. 
In another paper the same authors undertook a critical review of the 
International Safety Rating (ISR) system in South African mining (Eisner and 
Leger 1988b).  The ISR scheme was a revised version of the IMSR scheme.  
They noted that the very competitiveness between mining companies 
engendered by the Star awards could lead to anything from, at best, wishful 
thinking to, at worst, falsification of records.  The value of Star award schemes 
is therefore in doubt.  Importantly, they found no correlation between the Star 
rating and accident rate.  "Thus, whatever the effect of the ISR on mine safety, it 
does not appear to manifest itself in relative accident rates" (Eisner and Leger 
1988b).  In a similar vein, Lewis (1994) stated that there is no or little 
relationship between Star rating and death rate in the mining industry, and that 
there is no solid evidence that South African industry has been getting safer 
since NOSA began its work, referring to work of Leger and Macun (1990)..   
The South African Public Commission of Inquiry into Safety and Health in the 
Mining Industry concluded that although safety management systems may have 
made some contribution to improving safety at some mines, they had become 
largely discredited in the eyes of those employed at the mines and in public 
perception, because of the very large disasters that continued to occur at mines 
with high Star ratings, and their imperceptible impact on the overall level of 
fatal and major injuries in South African mines.  "While mining companies and 
mines must be free to use these systems if they feel they will assist them in 
improving health and safety, the Commission finds no basis for encouraging 
the adoption of these systems."  (Leon et al., 1995, Vol 1:78). 
                                                   
3  For sake of completeness, the Chamber of Mines responded to the critique in a later issue 
(Wagner 1988). 
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Guastello (1991) undertook secondary analysis on accident experience data 
from South African gold mines, Australian coal mines and North American 
industry that employ the International Safety Rating (ISRS) scheme from ILCI.  
He also found that the ISR scheme "has no discernible effect on accident rates". 
1.5 A critical review of the critique 
Eisner and Leger (1988b) found no correlation between the Star rating and the 
accident rate of South African gold mines.  Statistical tests are designed in a 
manner that a null-hypothesis is formulated and then sought rejected.  In this 
case, the question is if accident rates are independent of the star rating, i.e. the 
null-hypothesis becomes:  Accident rates are similar.  Two kinds of statistical 
errors can be made.  The first kind is to reject the null-hypothesis, when it is 
actually true.  This is known as a Type 1 Error and is normally addressed by 
referring to a certain level of significance.  The second kind of error, however, 
is to accept a null-hypothesis when it is actually wrong.  This is known as a 
Type 2 Error and the statistical test itself provides no information on the 
magnitude of this error.  Hence, any "conclusion" based on acceptance of the 
null-hypothesis is dubious.  
A review of the conditions leading to Eisner and Leger's (1988b) finding will 
highlight this point.  The authors observe that Star ratings of the mining 
companies have gradually increased so that most mines had achieved 4 or 5-
Star status.  They aptly term this phenomenon "Star-saturation".  However, 
from a statistical point of view, this implies that the Star rating loses much of 
its predictive validity.  They have to accept the null-hypothesis: accident rates 
are similar.  This could be an artefact of the nature of the data, and the test, 
rather than the impact of the Star scheme.  The same critique equally applies to 
the analysis by Guastello (1991)4.   
This paper will not enter a discussion whether 5-Star systems of the 1980s were 
able to improve workplace safety or not.  Certainly, the exorbitant injury rates 
amongst black workers in South African mines in the 1980s suggest that safety 
management practices of that sector were not particularly advanced.  Leger 
(1992:89) noted that at current accident levels, a black underground miner who 
spends twenty years underground faces a one in thirty chance of being killed 
and a risk of nearly one in two of being permanently disabled.  A senior 
medical doctor at the National Centre for Occupational Health in Johannesburg 
said that they found people "dying from asbestosis inside the gates of 5-Star 
companies" (Hedlund 2002), indicative that health hazards were not considered. 
1.6 Justification for this study 
The papers referred to above have been relatively influential, partly because so 
few other studies have been carried out.  In a frequently cited book, Nichols 
and Tucker (2000:304) observed that: "There is much testimonial support for 
                                                   
4  Guastello (1993) retracted the earlier significance tests, though not on Type 2 error con-
siderations.   
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the efficacy of OHSM systems from promoters [...] and business users [...], but 
what little available empirical evidence there is paints a less rosy picture."  The 
authors then refer to the 1988 papers.  In a report prepared for the Australian 
National Occupational Health and Safety Commission on OHSM systems, 
several experts asserted “they don’t work” although a more common position 
was that they could work, but “the jury is still out” (Gallagher et al. 2000).   
In what they say is the first systematic literature review, Robson et al. (2007) 
investigated the effectiveness of mandatory and voluntary OHS management 
system interventions on employee health and safety outcomes.  After screening 
out studies where the quality of evidence was rated “low” or “very low” only 
one single study (Bunn et al. 2001) was found to contain information relating 
changes in audit scores to changes in final OHS outcomes.  An examination of 
this study reveals several weaknesses though.  Much of the early criticism of 5-
Star systems would also apply to the Bunn et al. (2001) study, in particular the 
intervention’s narrow focus on cost control (similar to Loss Control) and its 
blatant use of aggressive case management, return-to-work programs and so-
called ‘work hardening’ schemes, conditioning employees for the physical 
demands of their job.  To summarize, the priority given to primary prevention 
is not presented convincingly in the Bunn et al. (2001) study.  Robson et al. 
(2007) concluded there was a real knowledge gap in this area. They found 
insufficient evidence in the published, peer-reviewed literature on the 
effectiveness of voluntary OHS management systems to make 
recommendations either in favour of or against them. 
Robson and Bigelow (2010) intended to review the research evidence on the 
measurement properties of OHS management audits using the methods of 
systematic literature reviews but had to lower the study’s ambitions due to a 
lack of published studies.  The authors found only one study of construct 
validity in the literature on OHS audits that used statistical analyses - the Eisner 
and Leger (1988b) study on 5-Star systems.  The authors noted that others 
before them have commented on the paucity of available research.  “In 1988, 
Eisner and Leger remarked that ‘A thorough search … failed to discover any 
publication evaluating the [ISR] scheme' by academic authorities, even though 
the audit method was internationally recognized at the time.  One decade later, 
Dyjack said he was 'unable to identify published studies evaluating the 
accuracy and repeatability of either publicly or privately held occupational 
health and safety assessment instruments'." (Robson and Bigelow 2010:S38). 
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2 Method 
2.1 Methodological considerations 
The propensity to report occupational accidents, in particular the less serious 
ones, is influenced by social processes and other factors not related to safety.  
Four decades ago, the Lord Robens Committee noted that statistics based on 
length of absence from work were intrinsically unreliable.  In comparison do 
statistics of fatalities and serious injuries provide more reliable indices of safety 
performance (Robens 1972:134-136).  This is exactly the critique voiced by 
Eisner and Leger (1988a) who pointed to a discrepancy between lost-time 
incident and fatality rates, and by Lewis (1994), who said that the NOSA 
system encourages aggressive monitoring of accident claims rather than 
addressing basic accident causes.  This type of critique can only be addressed if 
the evaluation measure is serious injury, the reason why this study only 
considers fatal accidents and permanently disabling accidents (loss of a limb 
etc.) as measures of safety performance.   
The rare occurrence of those events has important methodological implications.  
The number of work injuries that occur over a period of time is commonly 
described by the Poisson statistical distribution.  Because the standard deviation 
is the square root of the mean for this distribution, a large number of injuries 
and hence a large sample are required before a difference in performance will 
show as statistically significant, i.e. before the risk of committing Type 2 Errors 
is small.  It must therefore be expected, a priori, that a survey of serious OHS 
outcomes will have limited ability to demonstrate significance. 
The ideal evaluation study is one in which companies are allocated at random 
to either treatment or control conditions (Shannon et al. 1999).  In the face of 
the considerable effort, time and associated costs involved in implementing the 
NOSA system and the large sample size required, the ideal design is beyond 
reach.  If the NOSA 5-Star System were effective, the stated objective of 
accident prevention should manifest itself in lower rates of serious injury in 
NOSA companies than in the industry as a whole.  A test of this hypothesis 
would be within reach, given this study’s financial and practical constraints.   
The DIIR metric used in the determination of the NOSA Star-rating relates to 
injuries causing lost work time and is insensitive to the severity of the injury.  
NOSA auditors do not request information specifically on fatal and 
permanently disabling incidents.  NOSA can therefore not provide OHS 
The relationship between the implementation of voluntary Five-Star occupational health and safety management system 
and the incidence of fatal and permanently disabling injury 
C:\Users\FHHE\Documents\Artikler\2013-03 NOSA\Safety Science\4 Publishing\Nosa 1 36.docx 
13 
.  
outcome data of interest to this study.  In theory, this kind of information could 
be available from the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner (WCC).  
Hedlund (2002) attempted to do so, but faced various complications; in part 
because the NOSA audit concerns a work site, whereas the WCC holds 
registrations for entities that often comprise multiple sites; in part because 
WCC statistics are only available with a considerable delay.  In practice 
therefore, information on fatal and permanently disabling incidents have to be 
retrieved directly from the companies through self-reporting. 
2.2 Data collection procedure 
A cross-sectional postal survey was undertaken.  The universe was defined as 
all companies in the manufacturing industry, which had been Star-rated by 
NOSA at least once during the 3-year period 1997-1999.   
Records were received from ten NOSA office locations from which a list of 
companies was created.  Some companies were only purchasing training, not 
auditing, services, or were on the lists for other reasons.  Companies with no 
audits in the 3-year period of interest or with a postal address outside South 
Africa were taken off the list.  Each list entry was then examined in order to 
determine if it was in the manufacturing sector, defined as SIC categories 6-14 
in the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner's annual statistics.  This 
process eventually identified a universe comprising 399 companies.   
A questionnaire was mailed, attention “The Safety Officer or the General 
Manager”, soliciting their Star-rating, number of employees, and number of 
fatal and permanently disabling injuries for each of the years 1997, 1998 and 
1999, and other information.  Much effort was put into obtaining a high 
response rate.  Enclosed with the questionnaire was an endorsement letter 
signed by the NOSA CEO and a reply envelope to the author's work address 
with an identification number printed on the reply address label.  Up till 3 
reminder letters were sent to non-responding companies in follow-up activities.  
Companies that returned incomplete or conflicting information, and had used 
the reply envelope, were contacted telephonically in an attempt to identify the 
respondent and clarify the response.  The questionnaire activity took place 
March 2000 - July 2000. 
The records received from the ten geographical NOSA offices also comprised 
basic information on some audits.  The data were clearly incomplete, with 
many registrations for 1998, some for 1997 and 1999, and occasionally for 
earlier years.  It was possible to extract basic data on 1,963 audits (Star-rating, 
audit score, DIIR, number of employees and SIC category), though often with 
some fields blank.  This data set, henceforth the Basic Data Set on Audits, may 
serve as a crude population reference group and help determine if the 
companies that returned the questionnaire (the sample) were representative for 
all NOSA rated manufacturing companies (the population).  
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NOSA kindly provided records, an endorsement letter and access to audits, but 
has otherwise not been involved in or contributed to this study, directly or 
indirectly.   
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3 Results 
3.1 Response rate 
251 companies returned the postal questionnaire, equivalent to a 63 percent 
response rate.  Seventeen companies indicated that they were not in the 
manufacturing sector or had not been audited, reducing the number of useful 
questionnaires to 234.  The companies reported that 592 audits had taken place 
during 1997-1999.   
3.2 Population properties 
Analysis of the Basic Data Set on Audits shows that NOSA audits more 
manufacturing than non-manufacturing companies and that manufacturing 
companies generally receive a higher Star-rating (Figure 1), the finding is 
statistically significant.5  The data also show some evidence of "Star-saturation" 
with about 70 percent of all Star-ratings for manufacturing being in the top Star 
brackets, 4-Star or more.  If the Basic Data Set on Audits is taken as a 
population reference group, analysis shows that the sample of NOSA 
manufacturing companies that returned the questionnaire have higher Star-
ratings than NOSA rated manufacturing companies in general (Figure 2) - i.e. 
companies with a low Star-rating had a low response rate.  The finding is 
statistically significant.6 
                                                   
5  Two distributions of awarded Stars are examined: 1) for companies in SIC categories 6-
14  (manufacturing); and 2) all other companies, including those with missing SIC catego-
ry.  Null hypothesis: H0: distributions are similar, rejected (P<0.001) using a Wilcoxon–
Mann–Whitney test. 
6  Two distributions of awarded Stars are examined: 1) for companies in the Basic Data Set 
on Audits that are in manufacturing; and 2) companies that returned the postal question-
naire.  Null hypothesis: H0: distributions are similar, rejected (P<0.001) using a Wilcoxon–
Mann–Whitney test. 
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Figure 1 Star-distribution for Basic Data 
Set on Audits, the manufacturing 
subgroup receive higher Star-
ratings than sub-group non-
manufacturing 
 
Figure 2 The questionnaire response rate 
was higher for companies with a 
high Star-rating.  Curves are illus-
trative only. 
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Figure 3 The postal questionnaire response rate was higher for companies with 
many employees.  NOSCAR companies are larger than companies in 
other Star-brackets.  Width of bars indicate number of observations in 
group. 
 
For the population, manufacturing companies awarded the elite NOSCAR 
rating have significantly7 more employees (median 489 employees) than 
companies in the 1-5 Star-brackets (median 176 employees), see Figure 3 .  A 
similar conclusion was reached for the questionnaire sample data.  The 4-Star 
and 5-Star companies that returned the questionnaire are slightly larger (median 
228 and 209 employees) than 4-Star and 5-Star companies in the population 
(median 171 and 176 employees).  Both findings are significant at close to the 
P=0.01 level.8   While the differences are statistically significant an inspection 
                                                   
7  The Basic Data Set on Audits was divided into two groups, NOSCAR companies and 
companies with a 1-5 Star-rating.  Null hypothesis: H0: the distribution of number of em-
ployees in both groups are similar, rejected (P=0.001) using a Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney 
test.  For Star-brackets 1-5, intergroup differences with respect to number of employees 
were not significant.   
8  Again using the two-sided Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test. 
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of Figure 3 would indicate that the overall correspondence between the sample 
and the population is fine.  
 
3.3 Imputations 
Although companies are expected to be audited every year, 76 companies (32 
percent) in the postal questionnaire sample did not report a full 3-year audit 
history.  Some of the companies that were contacted telephonically stated major 
organisational restructuring processes such as acquisition of another company, 
downsizing of own organisation, moving to new premises, etc., as reasons for 
letting their rating lapse.  Many companies with lapsed 5-Star ratings said they 
for all practical reasons had maintained the NOSA system.  Other reasons for 
not having a full 3-year audit record were recent introduction or abandoning of 
the NOSA system.   
A key objective of the survey is to determine the number of serious accidents 
that had taken place each calendar year over the 3-year period and the 
corresponding Star rating and the number of employees exposed to the 
workplace hazards.  An incomplete audit pattern may introduce systematic bias.  
For example, the five-Star Company A skipped an audit in 1998, the same year 
the company experienced a fatal injury (Table 2).  Bearing in mind the 
considerable effort required to implement the NOSA system and to maintain a 
high Star-rating, it is reasonable to pool the performance of this company with 
that of other 5-Star companies.  A parallel situation exists for Company B 
(Table 2), which seems to have introduced the NOSA system in 1998 and 
attained a 3-Star entry rating, but skipped the audit in 1999, the year it 
experienced a fatal injury.   
Why would companies let their Star-rating lapse if they experience injuries?  
As stated earlier, NOSA auditors request the company's accident performance 
of the past 365 calendar days, when computing the DIIR lost-time metric.  If 
companies fear that the occurrence of a fatal accident may have a negative 
influence on the auditors' scoring of the company's effort (the audit score) it 
could be attractive to let the Star-rating lapse to maintain a clean 365 days 
history window.  Hedlund (2011) reports the results of participant observation 
during NOSA audits and describes a case where the company safety officer 
successfully concealed the deaths of two contractors from the NOSA auditors 
simply by letting the Star-rating lapse. 
Star-ratings were imputed according to this procedure: a 3-Star rating can be 
extended one year forwards, a 4-Star one year forwards and one year 
backwards, a 5-Star two year forwards and one year backwards, and a 
NOSCAR Star two year forwards and backwards.  This procedure is slightly 
different than the one reported in Hedlund (2002).   
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Table 2 Examples of skipped audits in questionnaire sample 
 1997 1998 1999 
Company A    
   Number of fatal injuries 0 1 0 
   Number of permanently disabling injuries 0 0 0 
   Star rating 5 not rated 5 
Company B    
   Number of fatal injuries 0 0 1 
   Number of permanently disabling injuries 0 0 0 
   Star rating not rated 3 not rated 
 
3.4 Reference group 
Hedlund (2013) examined the accident performance of the South African 
manufacturing industry and reported various complications in extracting 
reliable statistics for the period of interest.  Two sources of accident statistics 
are available, from the Department of Labour (DOL) and the Workmen's 
Compensation Commissioner (WCC).  The two sources differ in scope.  DOL 
registrations exclude road accidents arising out of employment, but include 
contractor incidents at company premises.  WCC registrations include road 
accidents arising out of employment, but exclude contractors injured at 
company premises because they are not insured by the company (and perhaps 
not insured at all).   
NOSA's procedure for computing the DIIR aligns broadly with WCC criteria 
with the important difference that NOSA also includes contractor accidents 
whereas WCC does not.  Unfortunately, little is known about the number of 
contractor incidents that are lost from WCC statistics and currently no reliable 
basis exists for making adjustments.  In addition, Hedlund (2013) argued that 
the number of reported fatal injuries in 1999, the most recent WCC statistical 
publication, appeared unusually low.  With the caveat that WCC statistics 
probably underestimate the actual performance of the reference group, available 
key statistics are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3 Accident experience of reference group 
      
Calendar  
year 
Employee  
years 
a
 
Fatal injury Permanently disabling 
injury 
Number of 
injuries 
b
 
Incidence 
rate 
c
 
Number of 
injuries  
Incidence 
rate 
c
 
1997 1,395,636 197 - 2,908  
1998 1,339,888 197 - 2,617  
1999 1,314,488 126 - 1,826  
Total 4,050,012 520 1.28 7,351 18.15 
Source: Hedlund (2013) 
a 
  Bulletin employment data 
b
  If regression equation (3) in Hedlund (2013) is used, the total number of fatal injuries com-
putes to 522, the lower figure of 520 is used here. 
c
  Incidence rate pr 10,000 employees per year 
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3.5 Accident experience of questionnaire sample 
companies 
Table 4 presents the number of fatal and permanently disabling injuries and the 
number of man-years worked.  The entire sample has a lower incidence of fatal 
injuries than the reference group, the finding is significant at the P=0.09 level.  
Only the performance of NOSCAR companies attains a high level of statistical 
significance at P=0.003.  With regard to permanently disabling injuries, NOSA 
companies clearly have fewer such accidents than the reference group, the 
finding is significant at the P<0.001 level.  In conclusion, there is empirical 
evidence that NOSA manufacturing companies have fewer fatal injuries than 
the national average for manufacturing, and strong empirical evidence that they 
have fewer permanently disabling injuries.   
  
The relationship between the implementation of voluntary Five-Star occupational health and safety management system 
and the incidence of fatal and permanently disabling injury 
C:\Users\FHHE\Documents\Artikler\2013-03 NOSA\Safety Science\4 Publishing\Nosa 1 36.docx 
21 
.  
Table 4 Accident experience of survey sample companies 1997-1999 and signif-
icance testing 
         
Star  
category 
Fatal injury Permanently disabling injury 
Observed 
employee  
years 
Observed 
number of 
injuries 
Expected 
number of 
injuries
 b
 
H0: Ob-
served >= 
Expected 
(P-value) 
c
 
Observed 
employee  
years 
d
 
Observed 
number of 
injuries 
Expected 
number of 
injuries
 b
 
H0: Ob-
served >= 
Expected 
(P-value) 
c
 
1-Star - - -  - - -  
2-Star 1,251 0 0.2  1,251 6 2.3  
3-Star 40,624 5 5.2  24,624 20 44.7 <0.001 
4-Star 99,944 15 12.8  74,716 28 136 <0.001 
5-Star 105,097 9 13.5 0.136 97,179 45 176 <0.001 
NOSCAR 
a
 45,918 0 5.9 0.003 32,918 8 59.7 <0.001 
Total 292,834 29 37.6 0.089 230,688 107 419 <0.001 
a 
 NOSCAR is an elite "6-Star" bracket in the 5-Star system. 
b  
Assuming incidence rate of reference group. 
c
  Computed directly from Poisson distribution. 
d
  Some companies reported the number of fatal injuries, but not the number of permanently disabling injuries, in partic-
ular for the early years in the period.  There are therefore fewer employee man-years for the permanently disabling inju-
ry category than for the fatal injury category.
 
 
 
Table 5 Computed injury incidence rates for survey sample companies 1997-
1999 including confidence intervals 
       
Star  
category 
95 percent confidence intervals 
a b
 
Fatal injury Permanently disabling injury 
 Lower 
bound 
Ob-
served 
Upper 
bound 
Lower 
bound 
Ob-
served 
Upper 
bound 
<= 3-Star 0.24 1.19 2.39 6.57 10.0 13.9 
4-Star 0.80 1.50 2.30 2.41 3.75 5.22 
5-Star 0.38 0.86 1.43 3.29 4.63 6.07 
NOSCAR  0 0 0.65 
c
 0.91 2.43 4.25 
       
<= 4-Star 0.85 1.41 2.04 3.98 5.37 6.86 
5-Star 0.38 0.86 1.43 3.29 4.63 6.07 
NOSCAR  0 0 0.65 
c
 0.91 2.43 4.25 
a
  Incidence rates are per 10,000 workers per year. 
b
  Computed directly from Poisson distribution, two-tailed. 
c
  Upper confidence bound when no events are observed are computed using the 'rule of 
threes', which coincides with the upper limit of a one-tailed 95% confidence interval from the 
Poisson distribution. 
 
How well the Star rating can predict the incidence of serious injury is a 
measure of criterion validity.  Table 5 presents computed confidence intervals 
for fatal and permanently disabling injury for different Star brackets.  Because 
of the low number of observations the lower Star categories were pooled into a 
single bracket.  Results are shown in Figure 4.   The internal ranking in plots a) 
and d) is not fully consistent, with 3-Star companies (perhaps) having fewer 
fatal accidents than 4-Star companies; and 4-Star companies having fewer 
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permanently disabling injuries than 5-Star companies.  It is notable however, 
that any line drawn through all confidence intervals will, for both injury types, 
exhibit a negative slope.  It is thus concluded that the NOSA Star rating is a 
sound, although imperfect, predictor of injury rates.  Plots b) and d) shows what 
happens if Star categories 4 and fewer are pooled into a single bracket.  The 
internal ranking becomes fully consistent, fatal injuries maintain a significant 
negative slope, but significance is lost for permanently disabling injuries 
(confidence intervals overlap). 
In conclusion, the data offer support to the original claim by NOSA that "a 5-
Star grading would indicate that it is one of the safest factories in the country".  
 
 
Figure 4 Computed incidence rates and 95 percent confidence intervals for seri-
ous occupational injury.  In plots b) and d) 3-Star and 4-Star -ratings 
are pooled into a single bracket.  The Star rating is a sound, although 
imperfect, predictor of injury rates 
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4 Discussion 
4.1 Potential errors in survey sample data 
Intermediate analysis of returned questionnaires revealed that some respondents 
explicitly noted that their reported fatal injury was a traffic accident occurring 
on a public road.  The NOSA definition of a Disabling Injury comprises any 
incident covered by the COID Act, which does include accidents on public 
roads if they arise out of employment.  They are therefore to be included in the 
questionnaire's injury experience section.  However, the explicit mentioning of 
a road accident could indicate a perceived unfairness on the part of the 
respondent, that the company's accident record is burdened by events over 
which management, arguably, has little or no control.  This raised the concern 
if a less experienced respondent would omit reporting road injuries and thereby 
introduce a systematic downward bias in the sample data.  Traffic accidents are 
a potentially significant source of error as about 40 percent of all fatalities in 
the manufacturing industry reported to the WCC are classified as vehicle 
accidents, i.e. accidents that involve a vehicle regardless of whether the 
accident occurs on company premises or on public roads (Hedlund 2013).  In 
the last follow-up campaign, non-responding companies were sent a revised 
questionnaire with an additional question:  if they would include road accidents 
in their reported injury figures.  28 companies (76 percent) replied Yes, 7 
replied No, and 2 replied Don't know.  The sample fatality figures could 
perhaps be underreported with up to about 10 percent (0.24*0.4); in this case 
the overall significance level in Table 4 would change from P=0.09 to P=0.16. 
A similar potential error was identified regarding noise induced hearing loss 
(NIHL), which in the COID Act is classified both as a disease and as a 
permanently disabling injury.  A less experienced respondent might 
erroneously omit reporting of NIHLs on the grounds that it is a disease, not an 
injury, introducing a systematic downward bias.  However, only very few 
NIHLs are reported to the WCC and potential errors of exclusion appear 
negligible.  The inclusion of NIHLs might rather well introduce a systematic 
upward bias because companies with advanced OHS management systems 
would more likely identify, record and notify the compensation commissioner 
(and hence NOSA auditors) of this condition, i.e. precisely the companies with 
high Star ratings.   
The questionnaire method relies on the respondent's ability to correctly recall 
events 3 years back in time.  Some companies reported the number of fatal 
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injuries, but not the number of permanently disabling injuries, in particular for 
the early years in the period.  Potential reasons for this could be inability to 
recall the correct number, for instance due to short tenure of the respondent, or 
due to inconvenience if it would require retrieval of old records.  Less than 20 
percent of the respondents reported a tenure of 0-4 years, however.  The 
potential impact on the number of fatal accidents reported for the three-year 
study period is likely minor; due to the traumatic nature of such serious 
accidents the knowledge will remain in corporate memory for longer than this. 
The most significant error is probably related to mistakes in filling out the 
questionnaire form.  Postal questionnaires are blunt data collection instruments 
and during telephone follow-up activity many mistakes were discovered, for 
instance that a secretary had intercepted and filled out the questionnaire (with 
errors) on behalf of the safety manager, or that a hurried respondent had entered 
the much larger numbers for NOSA disabling incidents (lost-time), not 
permanently disabling incidents.  Only a few of such undiscovered mistakes 
may inflate the survey data significantly. 
4.2 No control group  
The ideal evaluation study is one in which companies are allocated at random 
to either treatment or control conditions (Shannon et al. 1999).  The present 
non-experimental design does not meet this high standard.  Statistical 
associations and causal inferences regarding the ability to improve safety 
performance can therefore, strictly speaking, not be made.  It could be the case 
that only the safer industries find the NOSA system attractive and that this 
select group has a lower accident rate than the national average regardless of 
whether a NOSA system is in place or not.  It does not seem very likely though, 
as many of the survey sample respondent companies were industrial enterprises 
with obvious work hazards, such as foundries, metal die casting, cold forging 
and other metal working operations, wooden furniture production, chemicals, 
ammunitions and explosives manufacturing.  Nevertheless, because there is no 
control group the possibility remains that the relationships reported here simply 
reflect some factor not controlled for.   
4.3 Accident rates for reference group 
As stated earlier, the WCC statistics probably underestimate the actual 
performance of the reference group because contractor injuries are 
systematically excluded from this data source.  It is remarkable that NOSA 
companies hardly have fewer fatal accidents than the reference group and at the 
same time have a much better performance when the outcome is permanently 
disabling incidents.  This could be due to inaccuracies in the WCC statistics or 
it may reflect that fatal accidents have a different causation than non-fatal as 
suggested by Salminen et al. (1992). 
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4.4 Distortions due to the voluntary nature of NOSA 
auditing 
The internal ranking in plots a) and c) (Figure 4) is not fully consistent, with 3-
Star companies (perhaps) having fewer fatal accidents than 4-Star companies; 
and 4-Star companies having fewer permanently disabling injuries than 5-Star 
companies.   
A possible explanation could be that 3-Star companies are less committed to 
the NOSA system and simply opt to abandon it if they experience a fatal injury.  
Similarly, the permanently disabling injury rate for the 4-Star category is lower 
than that for the 5-Star category.  The registration of noise induced hearing 
losses could be a possible explanation if the higher star companies are more 
likely to identify and register that type of injury correctly. 
The most prominent source of distortion may be associated with the fact that 
auditing is an entirely voluntary activity.  For example, it may be speculated if 
companies with mediocre safety activities are more likely to opt to abandon or 
pause the auditing scheme in the event that they experience a (rare) serious 
injury.  Assuming that they will generally be rated a low Star rating due to a 
low score on the "effort leg" they will as a group have a (biased) low number of 
injuries thus distorting the predictive validity.  This type of behaviour may be 
difficult to handle in a voluntary system without also setting strong negative 
incentives for mediocre bona-fide companies to embark on the system.   
The research reported here was part of a larger project and other data collection 
efforts took place, including attitude statements enclosed with the postal 
questionnaire, participant observation, and others.  The results are reported 
elsewhere (Hedlund 2002, 2011).  The attitude statements were worded as 
concise assertions and respondents were asked to mark the extent to which they 
agreed or disagreed using a four-point Likert scale.  Companies with a 
superficial or a non-genuine commitment to safety would be expected to 
answer affirmatively to the question (Q34) "Safety works until we are busy, 
then other things take priority".  A considerable minority of one out of three 
respondents conceded that this was the case.  The respondents generally had a 
positive view of the diligence and thoroughness of the NOSA 5-Star system.  A 
majority (72%) of the respondents disagreed with the statement (Q12) ”We 
could hide a sensitive safety issue from a NOSA auditor, if we wanted to do 
so.”   
Spearman correlation coefficients were computed to reveal significant 
associations.  A high Star-rating, and hence a better accident performance, was 
positively associated with a high tenure of the respondent (P<0.001) and 
positively associated with the company's overall attitude to safety (Q34), 
(P=0.004)  
The sizable minority of companies that expressed they could deceive the NOSA 
auditors, hiding sensitive issues (Q12), had a poor safety attitude score (Q34) 
(P<0.001), indicative that their preventive safety efforts were lacking and they 
indeed could have a motive to try to hide things.  Yet, their Star rating did not 
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appear to be negatively influenced by their lacking safety efforts, the 
association was negative but far from significant (P=0.61).  The correlation 
analysis therefore offers some credibility to their claim, that they are able to 
deceive auditors.  Hence, intentional and successful deception of auditors by a 
sizable minority is a possible explanation for the imperfect relationship 
between the Star-rating and the accident performance.   
Methodological problems in evaluating accident prevention programmes 
abound.  The overall conclusion, however, is the Star rating is a sound although 
imperfect predictor of injury rates. 
4.5 Implications for voluntary OHS management 
systems 
How should the results be interpreted in a broader context?  Voluntary OHS 
management systems are in very widespread use and have evidently come to 
stay.  At the same time, there is a continuous flow of disconcerting evidence, 
suggesting occasional failure.  In December 2012, a textile factory in Karachi, 
Pakistan, burned quickly, killing at least 262 workers.  Safety conditions were 
appalling with locked emergency exits and barred windows that prevented 
workers from leaping to safety.  Yet, just three weeks before the blaze the 
factory was awarded a SA8000 certificate, one of the most prestigious in the 
industry, issued under the auspices of Social Accountability International, 
created to set and safeguard baseline standards for supply-chain workers in 
poor countries, particularly those with corruption-prone governments and weak 
unions.  A SA8000 certificate is meant to signal that the factory meets basic 
requirements in eight areas, including health and safety, wages, working hours 
and child labour (Walsh and Greenhouse 2012). 
A fatal accident in a Swedish plant occurred just after DNV had certified its 
management system.  The subsequent labour inspection inquiry established that 
the fatality was caused by systematic management mistakes.  In the ensuing 
debate, DNV claimed to have certified only the existence of a management 
system, not that it was implemented in practice (Frick 2011).   
The sporadic failures of voluntary OHS audit systems pale however, when 
compared to the occasional dysfunction of voluntary audit systems in other 
sectors.  In their report, the financial crisis inquiry commission concluded that 
the credit rating agencies were key enablers of the financial meltdown (FCIC 
2011:xxiv). Their job was to provide an objective analysis of the risk posed to 
investors.  Sellers of securities, who paid the credit rating agencies for their 
assessment work, were interested in high ratings because certain investors like 
retirement funds were required by law or charter only to hold investment-grade 
securities.  This system broke down, as hundreds of billions of dollars of assets 
later shown to be worthless received high ratings from the agencies.  
Christopher Cox, the head of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, a 
long-time proponent of deregulation, said that the financial crisis had “made it 
abundantly clear that voluntary regulation does not work”.  The fact that 
investment bank holding companies could withdraw from voluntary 
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supervision at their discretion diminished the perceived mandate of the 
program, and weakened its effectiveness (Labaton 2008).  The accounting 
scandals at Enron and WorldCom, surpassing each other as the largest 
bankruptcies in U.S history has also tarnished the value of (mandatory) 
accounting audit practices and the reputation of celebrated accountancy firms. 
A cautious conclusion would therefore be that voluntary OHS audit systems are 
embedded in structural problems that set limits to what they can reasonably be 
expected to accomplish.  The fundamental issues are about naivety and the 
intrinsic viability of self-regulation.  In this light, the NOSA Star system would 
appear to do quite well indeed.   
This study will not enter a discussion if the early critique of South African 5-
Star systems was justified or not.  Bearing in mind the conclusions of the Leon 
Commission on mining referred to earlier, the critique may have influenced 
government policy and led to the decision to withdraw public funds from 
NOSA.  To the extent that this weakened the work of NOSA, culminating with 
a liquidity crisis in the mid-2000s, the critique would seem to have done a 
disservice to occupational safety in South Africa, despite intentions to the 
contrary.   
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5 Conclusion 
The NOSA 5-Star System is a voluntary combined safety management system 
and audit scheme.  The safety management system is of the Loss Control type 
based on the theories of Heinrich.  The objective of the audit scheme is to 
measure the effectiveness of the management system's accident prevention 
programme and award stars based on two criteria:  a) a pro-active measure 
based on the comprehensiveness of the accident prevention programme, the so-
called the effort leg, and, b) a reactive measure based on the actual lost-time 
incident frequency rate, the so-called the experience leg.  
This study finds that South African manufacturing companies, which were 
committed to the NOSA system in its 1997-1999 version, experienced fewer 
fatal and permanently disabling injuries than the reference group, the national 
average of manufacturing companies.  Overall, it appears plausible that this is 
due to the systematic prevention programme of the NOSA system.   
This study also finds an inverse correlation between the Star rating and the 
serious injury incidence rate.  Companies with high star ratings have lower fatal 
and permanently disabling injury rates than companies with low star ratings.  It 
is concluded that the Star rating is a sound although imperfect predictor of 
injury rates.  The fact that auditing is an entirely voluntary activity likely 
distorts the Star rating to some extent.  For example, it is speculated that some 
(unsafe) companies may abandon or pause the auditing scheme if they 
experience too many injuries.  There is also some evidence to suggest that 
companies with poor safety attitudes are able to deceive auditors.   
Methodological problems in evaluating accident prevention programmes 
abound.  However, the results of this study indicate that voluntary OHS 
management systems are capable of improving firm’s accident performance but 
also that the audit systems are imperfect and seem at least partly incapable of 
handling partial disclosure of information and intentional deception.  The 
problem likely resides in an inherent information asymmetry, that the audited 
party has more and better information than the auditing party.  Contributing 
factors may be a power imbalance and conflicts of interest; the auditors have 
few sanctions, they are paid by the audited party and they have no interest in 
estranging the business relation with the audited party. 
This may be an unwelcome result for the viability of mutual regulation.  In a 
broader view however, the adoption of such systems might well be endorsed by 
policymakers, because their positive impact on OHS performance could be 
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substantial when aggregated over an entire country.  It is clear though, that such 
systems cannot substitute authority enforcement activities at company level.  
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